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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT				
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA				
UNITED STATES OF A	AMERICA,	CA	ASE NO. 09CR	2582 WQH
vs.	Plai	ntiff, OF	RDER	
MATTHEW LA MADR LANCE LA MADRID ((ID (1),			
ERIC MONTEIL (3),	Defend	ante		
	Detend	ants.		
HAYES, Judge:				
	ore the Court, De	efendants move th	e Court to dec	lare this case complex
and exclude time pursuant to Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3161, et seq. (Doc. # 56, 55, 90).				
Defendants assert that the Court should declare this case complex based upon the				
massive discovery mater	rials including m	any thousands of	pages contain	ed on an internal hard-
drive and 7 compact dis	cs, and th additi	onal discovery p	romised but no	ot yet provided by the
Government. Defendan	ts assert that add	litional time is req	uired in order	to properly review the
large volume of discove	ry materials and	to prepare the de	efense in this fa	airly complicated and
lengthy bank fraud, win	e fraud, mail fr	aud case which o	occurred over	the past three or four
years. The Government	does not oppose	e a finding of con	nplexity under	the Speedy Trial Act.
Section 3161(h)(7)(A) provides that the Court may exclude any period of delay				
resulting from a continuance "if the judge granted the continuance on the basis of his findings 7				
that the ends of justice se			_	-
the defendant in a speed	y trial." Factors	s which a judge sh	nall consider in	determining whether

to grant a continuance under subparagraph (A) include "[w]hether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established..." Section 3161(h)(7)(B)(ii). "[N]o continuance period may be excluded unless the court makes reasonably explicit findings that demonstrate that the ends of justice served by granting the continuance do, in fact, outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." *United States v. Perez-Reveles*, 715 F.2d 1348, 1352 (9th Cir. 1983).

Based upon the complex nature of this fraud action involving a large volume of discovery, the Court concludes that it would be unreasonable to expect defense counsel to be able to adequately prepare for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established under Section 3161, et seq., taking into account the exercise of due diligence. The Court concludes that the ends of justice served by a continuance outweigh the best interest of the public and the Defendants in a speedy trial. Based upon the finding of complexity, the court will exclude the period of time between September 4, 2009 to January 11, 2010 in order to allow all defense counsel an opportunity to review and organize the large volume of discovery, to conduct the required investigation, and to effectively prepare pretrial motions.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion to declare this case complex and exclude time pursuant to Speedy Trial Act filed by Defendants (Doc. # 56, 55, 90) are granted.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that a period of excludable delay from September 4, 2009 to January 11, 2010 is allowed pursuant to Section 3161(h)(7), in addition to any time excludable pursuant to Section 3161(h)(1)(D). This period of excludable delay applies to all defendants in this case pursuant to Section 3161(h)(6). A further hearing has been scheduled in this matter for January 11, 2010 at 2 p.m.

DATED: October 29, 2009

WILLIAM Q. HAYES
United States District Judge